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Technical Studies as a member of the Na-
tional Honor Society. He received a scholar-
ship to Baruch College of the City University
of New York. He is also a graduate of Bronx
Community College. Ernesto was a Licensed
Real Estate broker and Vice President for
Milchman Enterprises Company, Inc. in the
Bronx.
Mr. Speaker, Ernesto was very active in the
Hunts Point community in my congressional
district. From 1980 to the time of his passing,
he was President of the Spofford Avenue
Housing Development Fund Corporation and
Chairman of the Board of Lapeninsula Com-
munity Organization, Inc. He was also a mem-
ber of the Hunts Point Task Force from 1990
to 1992 and the Bronx Borough President’s
Citizen Advisory Committee on Resource Re-
covery from 1990 to 1991. In addition, he was
a very active member of Community School
Board DIstrict 8. He was a Board Member
from 1989 until 1996; during this time, he
served as President (1991–92), Vice President
(1992–93) and Treasurer (1989–91).
Ernesto married Ramona Santiago on June
6, 1964 at St. John’s Church in the Bronx and
made their home in the Hunts Point section of
the Bronx. They had four children, Eric, Re-
becca, Beatriz and Wedalis, and six grand-
children, Michael, Cynthia, Marissa, Carlos,
Jr., Christian and David, Jr.
Ernesto inspired me and many other young
people from the Bronx. He had a remarkable
passion for life, tenacity to accomplish what he
set out to do, great courage and sensitivity.
He passed away unexpectedly on September
10, 1998. His untimely passing has left a void
not only in his family and community, but by
all those whose lives he has touched.
Mr. Speaker, on June 11, PS 48 honored
his memory during the dedication of the
Ernesto Muñoz auditorium. What a fitting trib-
ute.
Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to join me
in paying tribute to Ernesto Muñoz and in
wishing PS 48 continued success.
 
EVELYN ABELSON: POINT OF
LIGHT
HON. MAJOR R. OWENS
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, June 15, 1999
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Speaker, I rise to con-
gratulate an extraordinary community activist,
social worker, safety net administrator and
public policy strategist. From micro issues in-
volving school practices, neighborhood prior-
ities, and area action plans to macro policy
concerns and visions for improvements in City,
State and Federal benefits programs, she has
accumulated an inspiring record of achieve-
ments. On the occasion of her retirement I am
honored to salute Evelyn Abelson as a Point-
of-Light for our community and for all Ameri-
cans.
A native of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Ms.
Abelson came to Brooklyn with impressive
training as a Social Worker and significant po-
litical experience. Her compassion for the poor
and the powerless is great; and her passion
for organizing people for their own empower-
ment is equally remarkable.
Always the professional competence of Eve-
lyn Abelson is thoroughly blended with her
personal dedication and integrity. As Director
of a Mental Health Program in Brownsville, a
community composed primarily of low-income
housing developments, she changed the lives
of many individuals; however, her work with
families and groups had a widespread and
lasting impact on the entire community. The
Abelson lectures on family relationships at-
tracted a large grassroots audience.
Through her work with individuals and the
general community Ms. Abelson established a
base of trust which made her a very influential
and productive force in the embryonic Browns-
ville anti-poverty program. Evelyn convened
the Brownsville Professional Group composed
of a cross-section of professionals who
worked in the community. The blue-print for
the Brownsville Community Action Plan was
launched when this group convened a body of
local leaders who formed the Brownsville
Community Council.
Mr. Speaker, as a local Branch Librarian of
the Brooklyn Public Library and later as a Li-
brary Community Coordinator, I worked with
Ms. Abelson to develop the Brownsville Total
Action Plan which began with the election of
a Board of Directors for the Brownsville Com-
munity Council. For that first election and for
many others Ms. Abelson was a one woman
Election Commission whose results were
never challenged.
Ms. Abelson later established a Community
Mental Health Clinic in Brownsville. While her
professional work expanded and provided
greater support for many more families, she
continued in her role as a guiding community
activist and policy advisor. In my changing ca-
reers from Library Community Coordinator, to
Brownsville Community Council Executive Di-
rector, to Commissioner of the New York City
Community Action Program to New York State
Senator and finally to the United States Con-
gress I have steadfastly relied on Evelyn
Abelson’s unique ability to maintain one open
ear for the voice of the people on the bottom
while the other ear listened and interpreted the
sweep of local, national and international de-
velopments.
For this rare mixture of personal warmth,
abiding compassion and generosity, as well as
a penetrating mind anchored by experience
and wisdom, it is appropriate that we honor
Evelyn Abelson as a great American Point-of-
Light.
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IKE SKELTON: A MAN OF VISION,




IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, June 15, 1999
Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Speaker, I was
honored recently to have our friend and col-
league, IKE SKELTON, visit my district in Cali-
fornia. This gentleman, the Ranking Democrat
on the House Armed Services Committee, is
known to all of us as a man of intensity but
earnestness, a man of determination but flexi-
bility, a man of integrity above all else.
Congressman SKELTON was visiting the
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, the
Navy’s premier school for advanced technical,
engineering, and strategic education. He was
there to address the student body of the chal-
lenges they face as military leaders in an in-
creasingly complex geopolitical world commu-
nity. While at the school, he was presented
with an Honorary Degree of Doctor of Military
Sciences.
I was so impressed with the lecture Mr.
SKELTON presented and the citation by the
NPS Provost, Richard Elster, of Mr. SKELTON’S
achievements, I feel compelled to share them
with this body. I urge everyone to take the
time to read these remarks and consider their
meaning, especially as we struggle here with
foreign affairs and military and defense ques-
tions in a troubled world.
REMARKS ACCOMPANYING AWARD OF DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF MILITARY SCIENCES TO THE
HONORABLE IKE SKELTON
(Made by NPS Provost, Richard Elster)
Under the authority vested by law and
with the concurrence of the Secretary of the
Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Naval Postgraduate School is pleased to
award the Degree of Doctor of Military
Sciences to the Honorable Ike Skelton, Rep-
resentative of the Fourth District of the
State of Missouri to the Congress of the
United States.
Representative Skelton understands the
relationship between the nation’s security
and the maintenance of strong, robust armed
forces. He has consistently, and effectively,
used every means at his disposal to ensure
that the national security policy of the
United States recognizes the preeminent role
of the armed forces and that the Congress
provides resources to the Department of De-
fense and the military departments accord-
ingly.
Representative Skelton’s regard for the
military extends far beyond national secu-
rity imperatives to genuine, heart-felt con-
cern for the well being of every man and
woman in uniform. He understands the fun-
damental relationship between maintaining
the most powerful Armed Forces the world
has ever known and the education, training,
talent, and morale of the individuals who
comprise those forces. As Chairman of the
Military Personnel and Forces Sub-
committee of the House Armed Services
Committee, he systematically advanced ini-
tiatives to improve the quality of life and op-
portunities of military personnel. He sup-
ported military pay increases and sought to
secure acceptance of the principle that mili-
tary compensation should be comparable to
that of the private sector. He oversaw im-
provements in military health care and at-
tempted to secure a uniform benefit for all
eligible personnel, both active duty and re-
tired. In addition, he offered the amendment
that repealed the combat exclusion for
women on Navy ships.
Representative Skelton has also dem-
onstrated that a true friend of the armed
forces will recognize problems and insist
that they be corrected even in the face of
strong objections from the civilian and mili-
tary leadership of the Department of De-
fense. In the early 1980s, he became con-
vinced that the structure of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and combatant commands was fun-
damentally flawed. He was one of a handful
of legislators who drafted the Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1986. Consequently, history will
record that he was instrumental in framing
one of the three most significant laws relat-
ing to national security since the American
Revolution.
As chairman of the Panel on Military Edu-
cation, Representative Skelton contributed
immeasurably to improvements in profes-
sional military education. His panel found
that the officer corps needs more military
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strategists and that every officer should un-
derstand strategy. An avid student of his-
tory, Representative Skelton insisted that
staff and war colleges strengthen and expand
the study of military history and other sub-
jects related to the development of strategic
thinking. Under his leadership, the Panel
also effected curriculum changes that great-
ly enhanced joint military education and
raised the academic standards of the schools.
Representative Skelton continues to exer-
cise great influence over the direction of
military education. He has recognized the
compelling need for the officer corps to be
capable of meeting the challenges resulting
from the myriad technological changes that
are altering the way wars will be fought in
the future. In early 1998, he called upon the
Naval Postgraduate School to develop a new
paradigm for professional military edu-
cation, one that would integrate technical
and traditional subjects into a single coher-
ent professional military education course of
studies.
Representative Skelton has made other
significant contributions to national secu-
rity too numerous to detail. Years before the
current crisis, he urged that additional at-
tention and resources be devoted to recruit-
ing. He has consistently advocated better
utilization of the reserve components. He has
advanced original proposals for modifying
the force structure of the services to meet
the challenges of the post-Cold War period.
In summary, Representative Skelton has
made seminal contributions to military af-
fairs in the latter quarter of the Twentieth
Century. He epitomizes the ideal linkage
that should exist between Americans and
their Armed Forces in a democratic republic
animated by a strong tradition of civilian
control of the military.
It is an honor to award an honorary doc-
torate to an American of such singular dis-
tinction. Congratulations Mr. Skelton.
REMARKS OF REP. IKE SKELTON, NAVAL POST-
GRADUATE SCHOOL, APRIL 19, 1999, MON-
TEREY, CALIFORNIA
Today, I want to talk to you about the role
of Congress in carrying out its Constitu-
tional mandate with respect to the armed
forces. Many people do not know that the
Constitution—in Article I, Section 8—gives
Congress the power ‘‘To raise and support ar-
mies, . . .’’ and ‘‘To provide and maintain a
navy,’’. Fewer still know that Article I, Sec-
tion 8, further gives Congress the power ‘‘To
make rules for the government and regula-
tion of the land and naval forces;’’. Article II
of the Constitution designates the President
as ‘‘commander in chief of the army and
navy . . .’’, but no specific authority is grant-
ed. Many in the Department of Defense, both
military and civilian, are often uncomfort-
able with what they regard as ‘‘Congres-
sional interference’’ in national security af-
fairs. But the system works—the Constitu-
tion make Congress the link between the
American people and the military whose
mission it is to protect them. And, thus, it
helps ensure that there is public support for
the military.
Let me give you the history of two areas,
which will show you the system working at
its best—The Goldwater-Nichols Department
of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and
Professional Military Education, commonly
known as PME. These two areas are of pro-
fessional interest to you, and as some of you
may know, I was directly involved in Con-
gressional efforts in both of these areas.
GOLDWATER-NICHOLS
Around the time I began my service in
Congress—the late 1970’s and early 1980’s—
the U.S. military experienced a long series of
substandard operational performances, in-
cluding a number of failures and some disas-
ters: Vietnam, Pueblo, Mayaguez, Desert
One, Beirut, and Grenada.
In the wake of these events, it became
clear to a number of Members of Congress,
including me, that something was wrong and
that a solution needed to be found. I began
meeting with our military leaders, both ac-
tive and retired, to discuss the state of our
military and determine what Congress could
do to help fix the problems. Indeed, it was
not just a question of Congress wanting to
help fix the problems. As I mentioned ear-
lier, it was our responsibility under the Con-
stitution to fix the problems.
Among those I met with was a fellow Mis-
sourian, General Maxwell Taylor, the Com-
manding General of the 101st Airborne Divi-
sion at Normandy, and a former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Well in his 80’s by
the time I talked to him, but still every inch
a soldier, General Taylor shared with me the
perspectives he had gained in his long, illus-
trious military career, both in combat and
staff assignments. It was General Taylor who
first raised with me the issue or reorganiza-
tion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as critical to
solving the problems in our armed forces.
When other distinguished military leaders
and thinkers raised this same concern, I de-
cided that the issue of Joint Chiefs of Staff
reorganization needed some attention. So, I
introduced legislation to abolish the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Needless to say, that bill was
going nowhere, but it did get people’s atten-
tion, and it did help start the debate on the
need for reform.
More importantly, I got involved with this
issue on the House Armed Services Com-
mittee, working with other Members and
Staff who had an interest in this area.
Former Congressman Dick White of Texas
had held a series of often sparsely attended
hearings on the subject, along with a House
Armed Services Committee staffer who I like
to refer to as a national treasure—Archie
Barrett, a retired Air Force Colonel who had
published a study on Defense Reorganiza-
tion. The contributions of this outstanding
American in this area are immeasurable, I
am very pleased that Archie is with us today
because if any of you have tough questions,
he can answer them. When Congressman
White retired, I inherited Archie and the
issue.
As you might expect, many of the senior
civilian and military leaders of the Depart-
ment of Defense were opposed to any reform
or reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
including Defense Secretary Weinberger,
General John Vessey, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, and indeed every member of the
Joint Chiefs. If you know your history, you
will not be surprised to learn that the Navy
was especially opposed. Then Secretary of
the Navy John Lehman called me an ‘‘arm
chair strategist’’ in a Washington Post op-ed
article. He didn’t mean it as a compliment.
Then Vice Admiral Frank Kelso lectured me
like a school boy when I visited Norfolk.
‘‘You don’t know what you are doing,’’ he
told me.
We did have some strong support from
within the active and retired military, how-
ever, including General David Jones, the
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Shy Meyer, the former Army Chief
of Staff, and Admiral Harry Train, former
CINCLANT. There were even some within
the Navy with opposing views. After Admiral
Kelso’s lecture, his boss, Admiral Lee
Baggett, the CINCLANT, pulled me aside and
privately told me, ‘‘you are doing the right
thing.’’
Here are some of the problems that Con-
gress discovered during our hearings on the
Joint Chiefs of Staff:
The joint, or force employment, side of the
DOD structure was weak and often ineffec-
tive. On the other hand, the service, or input,
side of DOD was so strong that it regularly
stepped beyond its mission of organizing,
training, and equipping forces. The services
tended to dominate the joint side, often to
achieve parochial interests.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, a committee, was
collectively the principal military adviser to
the President, the National Security Coun-
cil, and the Secretary of Defense. The Serv-
ice Chiefs were often unable to fulfill their
dual-hat responsibilities. Decisions on the
most fundamental national security issues
were watered down or not given at all. It was
General Taylor who testified that the Joint
Chiefs often failed to answer the mail be-
cause the Chiefs could not resolve inter-
service disputes.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was only
a spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee. If the Committee could not
speak, or could only render watered-down
pronouncements based on the lowest com-
mon denominator of agreement, the Chair-
man could only be an ineffective spokesman.
One former National Security Adviser to the
President stated that on a number of occa-
sions he had witnessed the JCS Chairman
unable to provide advice to the National Se-
curity Council on the most fundamental
military issues of the day because the JCS
had failed to develop collective advice. At
other times, because the JCS Committee val-
ued unanimity, the advice was so bland that
it was of little value. One former Secretary
of Defense stated that JCS advice was less
than useless.
The Joint Staff was largely composed of
non-competitive officers, often on their first
staff tour. It was a dead-end assignment. The
Joint Staff served the Chiefs collectively,
and it was smothered with a thousand proce-
dures that subordinated it to service posi-
tions. For example, every word of every
Joint Staff paper—the source of formal JCS
advice—had to be approved by every service
before it could be submitted to the JCS for
its consideration.
The Unified Commanders (the CINCS)—the
Commanders of U.S. forces in the field on
whom the nation would depend for its sur-
vival in case of hostilities—were tied down
like Gulliver by constraints contained in
JCS-issued directives.
The CINCS had few of the authorities you
would expect a commander to possess:
They could not hire or fire their subordi-
nate commanders or staffs.
They lacked Court Martial authority.
They could not employ their forces as they
saw fit to accomplish their mission, Rather,
they were required to employ forces only in
accordance with service doctrine.
They did not control ammunition, food
supplies, and the myriad other materials
needed to conduct campaigns. Each service
had its own line of supply.
Their authority over their subordinate
service component commanders was very
tenuous—the component commanders’ prin-
cipal loyalty was to their service.
Let’s look at how these problems in the or-
ganization of the JCS before 1986 contributed
to some of the failed missions I mentioned
earlier:
In Vietnam, there were at least two land
chains of command and four air chains of
command reaching from the Pentagon to
forces in the theater.
Desert One—the disastrous 1980 attempt to
rescue hostages held by Iran—was conducted
by forces of all four services. Those forces
met for the first time during the operation,
had never exercised as a joint team, and were
led by multiple commanders responding to
multiple chains of command.
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In the terrorist bombing of the Marine bar-
racks in Beirut, the serpentine chain of com-
mand wound through six layers of command,
including officers from every service, before
it reached the ill-fated Colonel commanding
the Marine contingent on the ground—the
Secretary of Defense; the CINC at Mons, Bel-
gium; DCINC at Stuttgart, Germany;
CINCNAVEUR with headquarters in both
London and Naples; Sixth Fleet Commander
in the Mediterranean; and the Naval Task
Force commander off the coast of Lebanon.
The tragic Beirut bombing, with 241 U.S.
casualties, was the event that really con-
vinced many Members that Congress needed
to find out what was wrong within the De-
partment of Defense, and to take steps to
correct the problems. The late Congressman
Bill Nichols, a highly respected Member
from Alabama, was especially galvanized by
Beirut. Congressmen Hopkins, Aspin, and
Kasich, as well as Senators Goldwater,
Cohen, Nunn, and Levin, were also deeply in-
volved in the legislation that eventually was
named the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
You know the major provisions of the Act,
so I will not go over them in detail. However,
allow me to summarize the Act’s effect:
Now, the JCS Chairman, not the Com-
mittee, is the principal military advisor, a
role exemplified by General Colin Powell
during Just Cause and the Persian Gulf War.
Now, the Joint Staff reports to the Chair-
man. It is composed of talented and qualified
officers, and it is possibly the most powerful
staff in the Department of Defense.
Now, the CINCS posses the requisite com-
mand authorities, as was so amply dem-
onstrated by General Schwartzkopf in the
Gulf War.
Of course, Goldwater-Nichols was not the
sole cause of reversing the negative trend in
operational performance since 1986. It is
worth noting, however, that the U.S. Armed
Forces have experienced fourteen years of
outstanding success in conducting contin-
gency operations since that year. Of par-
ticular note are Operation Just Cause in
Panama and, Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, as I mentioned previously.
Finally, it is important to point out that it
was not the goal of Goldwater-Nichols to
weaken the services. To the contrary, Gold-
water-Nichols was intended to push them
firmly back into their legislatively assigned
roles—organizing, training, and equipping
forces to carry out the missions assigned to
the CINCs. I do not know if Goldwater-Nich-
ols has fully accomplished this objective, but
it has made a difference.
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
During 1988 and 1989, I was Chairman of the
Panel on Military Education of the House
Armed Services Committee. I have a confes-
sion to make—I did not want to get involved
in studying Professional Military Education.
I thought nothing could be more boring. Ar-
chie Barrett had to use his considerable pow-
ers of persuasion to convince that this area
needed to be studied. I am glad that he was
successful. The subject matter was fas-
cinating, and I believe the work of the Panel
was productive.
The Panel was formed because the House
Armed Services Committee perceived little
or no effort by DOD to comply with a key
provision of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. That
provision required DOD to examine the pro-
fessional military education schools and
make changes where necessary to ensure
that officers were being prepared to partici-
pate with other services in joint operations
and to serve in joint assignments.
The Panel visited every staff college, and
every war college. We held a hearing at most
of them, as well as hearings in Washington.
After more than a year, we issued a com-
prehensive 200-page report that contained
roughly 100 recommendations for changes in
military education.
At this point, I had planned to discuss each
of these 100 recommendations in detail. How-
ever, I know you all want to get home for
dinner tonight, so I will only outline in brief
what we found in regard to Navy PME.
First, the good news: We found that the
Naval War College was hands-down the best
service war college.
Next, the bad news: Naval officers attended
at most only one year of professional mili-
tary education whereas the other services
took pains to ensure that their most com-
petitive officers received two years. As a
consequence, the intermediate PME course
at Newport was almost an identical twin of
other. I suggested that the Navy consider
providing intermediate Professional Military
Education at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Moreover, in light of the pressing need for
the officer corps of the future to be able to
grasp the potential of new technologies to
change the way wars are fought, and to un-
derstand how to employ technologically ad-
vanced weapons and equipment, I wrote the
Chief of Naval Operations suggesting that an
intermediate PME curriculum at the Naval
Postgraduate School, ‘‘could interweave the
technological lessons that abound through-
out military history with an appreciation of
what technology offers today and a perspec-
tive of the future challenges facing officers
in the post-industrial era.’’
Recently, I learned that the Navy is plan-
ning to offer its intermediate course at the
Naval Postgraduate School starting later
this year. This is a giant step in the right di-
rection, and I am pleased that the Navy, at
least in part, is taking my suggestion seri-
ously. Eventually, I would really like to see
the Naval Postgraduate School, in partner-
ship with the Naval War College, be allowed
to develop a genuine intermediate PME cur-
riculum that uniquely integrates studies in-
tended to increase technological literacy of
the student officers with traditional PME.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by giving you a charge:
Make the Armed Forces a better institution
as a consequence of your service. During
your careers, I urge you continuously to ex-
amine your consequence of your service.
During your careers, I urge you continuously
to examine your service, the joint military
elements, and the Department of Defense
from a detached, objective perspective. As
you progress in rank, use your influence to
rectify flaws where you find them. Many,
perhaps most, of the problems discovered by
Congress in the organization of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and in Professional Military
Education had been identified in studies as
far back as the 1950’s. If DOD had acted—if
senior civilian and military leaders had ini-
tiated needed changes—legislation would not
have been required. Change was opposed by
those who wanted to preserve narrow paro-
chial interests. The result of that opposition
to change was, as mentioned before—Viet-
nam, Desert One, Beirut, Grenada. Do not
allow your service, the joint military ele-
ments, or the Department of Defense to re-
peat the mistakes of the past during your
watch.
The best way to avoid repeating the mis-
takes of the past is to commit to a lifelong
study of military history. Consider how Gen-
eral Schwartzkopf used the lessons of history
in at least three instances in his successful
Desert Storm campaign:
First, the thorough 40-day air campaign
which preceded the ground war recalls the
failure to conduct adequate bombardment at
the island of Tarawa in November of 1943.
The price paid for that failure at Tarawa was
heavy Marine Corps casualties. In the Gulf
War, the ability of Iraqi forces to offer oppo-
sition to our forces was severely reduced.
Second, consider the successful feint car-
ried out by the 1st Cavalry Division prior to
the actual start of the ground war. This re-
calls Montgomery’s strategy at the Battle of
the Marinth Line in North Africa against the
German Afrika Corps. This action led up to
the decisive battle at El Alamein.
Third, by utilizing a leftward flanking
movement when he launched the ground war,
General Schwartzkopf was taking a page
from the book of Robert E. Lee and Stone-
wall Jackson at the Battle of
Chancellorsville. As you will recall, Jack-
son’s forces conducted a brilliant flanking
maneuver and completely surprised Union
forces under General Joseph Hooker, in the
May 1963 battle.
Thank you for the opportunity to address
you today. God bless you, and I wish you all
in your careers.
 
THE CROP INSURANCE EQUITY
ACT OF 1999—COMPANION LEGIS-
LATION TO S. 1108
HON. CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING
OF MISSISSIPPI
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, June 15, 1999
Mr. PICKERING. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased
to have the opportunity today to introduce
companion legislation to S. 1108, the Crop In-
surance Equity Act of 1999, introduced by
Senators COCHRAN and LINCOLN on May 24,
1999.
This legislation will effectively function to re-
form the problems farmers across the nation
have encountered with the current infeasible
federal crop insurance program. Participants in
the federal crop insurance program will find
that this legislation benefits farmers nation-
wide, not simply farmers in one region of the
country.
The Crop Insurance Equity Act of 1999 re-
quires that the Federal Crop Insurance Cor-
poration re-evaluate current rating methods
and processes used in rating crop insurance
rates by September 30, 2000. In doing this,
the rates paid by many farmers may be re-
duced through these new procedures. How-
ever, if it is found that through this reassess-
ment rates would increase for farmers in cer-
tain geographic areas, the current rating sys-
tem is to remain in place. In restructuring
these rates, FCIC will begin its reassessment
with those commodities with the lowest partici-
pation rate of buy-up coverage plans.
Currently, farmers who buy the highest lev-
els of buy-up coverage receive the lowest lev-
els of government premium subsidy. This is a
direct link to the low percentage of farmers
who purchase buy-up coverage in my state.
The Crop Insurance Equity Act of 1999 will
equalize all levels of buy-up coverage ensur-
ing that all farmers, no matter what level of
buy-up coverage they purchase, will receive
equal assistance from the federal government
in their purchase of buy-up coverage.
This legislation will further work to make
federal crop insurance more appealing by es-
tablishing a system of discounts and other pol-
icy options from which farmers may choose.
Farmers who effectively manage farm risk
through good management practices which re-
duce the risk of an insurable loss will receive
